



The Geopolitics of Global Trade and its Impact on the Asia-Pacific: What is at Stake?  
A Canadian perspective

Remarks to a Panel Discussion  
Chile-pacific foundation webinar

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14 January 2026

# A disrupted global economy

I.

## “MEGATRENDS”

- Fragmentation
- Digitalization
- Socialization
- Indo-Pacific as world’s fastest growing region, increasingly central to production and consumption

II.

## CURRENT CHALLENGES

- Return of the Tariff
- Economic Security
- Resulting Volatility and Uncertainty

III.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE RECONFIGURATION, TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION, AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION


- A world of clubs, coalitions, and sectoral initiatives
- Supply Chain Shifts, notably Vietnam, Mexico
- Risk of digital patchworks
- The people dimension: disaffection vs. need for education and skills, structural adjustment

# The Indo-Pacific: “connector” countries, Canada and Chile


## EMERGENCE OF “CONNECTOR” COUNTRIES

COUNTRIES GAINING MARKET SHARE IN US IMPORTS RECEIVED MORE FDI AND EXPORTS FROM CHINA SINCE 2017

CHANGE IN US IMPORT SHARE VS. CHINESE EXPORT SHARES  
(PERCENTAGE POINT)



CHANGE IN US IMPORT SHARE VS. FDI FROM CHINA  
(PERCENTAGE POINT)



Source: Gopinath et al. (2024), Trade Data Monitor; fDI Markets; and IMF staff calculations.  
Notes: Includes only nonaligned countries. LHS: change in U.S. import shares between 2018-23 and 2013-17 against change in Chinese export shares.  
RHS: change in U.S. import shares between 2018-23 and 2013-17 against change in Chinese outward FDI.  
The bubble size represents the US imports in pre-periods.

- **Chile and Canada share a DNA:** middle powers, Pacific-facing, partners in CPTPP, APEC, common commitment to open rule-based trade and investment, etc.

- **Collaboration can help to build broader bridges, e.g. ,** to influence and shape regional standards and build multilateral consensus

- **Opportunities to leverage: e.g., DEPA and CPTPP can be platforms** to lead trade facilitation, digital-trade governance and thus non-superpower supply chains for both intermediate and finished goods as well as services

- **Critical Minerals Partnerships:** to move from "extraction" to "mid-stream" processing partnerships with e.g., Japan, Korea, and ASEAN.

# Canada, Chile and the middle power “squeeze”

## Canada → United States

- ~⅔ of exports; dominant investor; deep supply-chain integration
- Key sectors tied to U.S. gravity: Energy (oil, gas, uranium, electricity); Critical minerals (nickel, cobalt, rare earths); Autos & EV supply chains (Ontario–Michigan corridor); Agrifood (grain, meat, processed foods)

## Chile → China

- ~40% of exports; major investor in mining, energy, infrastructure
- Key sectors tied to China’s demand: Copper (Chile’s core export); Lithium (Atacama; essential for global EV supply chains); Renewable energy (solar, green hydrogen); Fruit & agrifood (China as top market)

## Shared Vulnerabilities

- High concentration despite broad FTA networks: Chile 22 FTAs + 13 others covering 65 countries, 85%+ of global GDP; access to \$US 2.1 billion consumer volume; Canada 15 FTAs covering 51 countries, 61 % of global GDP, access to \$1.5b consumer volume
- Infrastructure bottlenecks limit diversification
  - Canada: ports, rail, transmission, critical minerals processing
  - Chile: ports, desalination, energy grids, mining corridors
- Investment: US “pull” and insistence on alignment on economic security and investment reviews challenges both countries’ inward investment needs and ambitions, especially for infrastructure, key sectors (e.g., critical minerals), value-added processing

# Canada's Strategic Advantage vs. Chile's Strategic Gap

## I. Canada: An Integrated Indo-Pacific Strategy

- Whole-of-government: diplomacy, trade, development, security, defence
- Clear investment attraction priorities
- Strengthened maritime and security presence
- Ability to coordinate across sectors and partners

**Outcome: Canada can actively diversify beyond U.S. dependence**

## II. Chile: Indo-Pacific Exposure Without an Indo-Pacific Strategy

- Deep economic ties but no integrated framework
- No coordinated investment attraction plan
- Limited security/defence engagement
- China remains the default anchor for copper, lithium, energy, and infrastructure

**Outcome: Chile cannot yet shape its Indo-Pacific engagement — it is shaped by it**

**Both countries need diversified Indo-Pacific trade and investment to build new sectors and reduce dependence — but only Canada has built the institutional architecture to pursue it.**

# Annex — Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Whole-of-Government Framework

Linking economic, security, sectoral, and societal tools into a single architecture to attract diversified Indo-Pacific investment and reduce structural dependence on the US

## 1. Economic & Trade Engagement

- Diversified market access: Japan, Korea, ASEAN, India
- Investment attraction priorities: Autos & EV supply chains; Critical minerals (processing + upstream partnerships); Clean energy & hydrogen; Agrifood and protein
- Trade facilitation & standards cooperation: digital trade, supply-chain resilience, regulatory alignment
- Infrastructure partnerships: ports, rail, transmission, mineral-processing capacity

## 2. Security & Defence Presence: to create a stable environment underpinning economic engagement and investment flows

- Expanded naval and air deployments to support regional stability
- Maritime domain awareness and cooperation with Japan, Korea, Australia
- Cybersecurity partnerships and counter-disinformation cooperation
- Defence diplomacy: exercises, officer exchanges, capacity-building

## 3. Sector-Focused Initiatives

- Critical minerals: joint ventures, supply-chain integration, technology partnerships
- Clean energy & hydrogen: pilot projects with Japan and Singapore
- Agrifood: market access expansion in ASEAN and India; food security partnerships
- Science, technology & innovation: research collaboration, commercialization pathways
- Green infrastructure: climate-aligned investment channels with Indo-Pacific partners

## 4. People-to-People & Institutional Connectivity

- Education & research mobility: student exchanges, joint labs, academic partnerships
- Immigration pathways: talent attraction from Indo-Pacific economies
- Cultural diplomacy: arts, language, and civil-society exchanges
- Diaspora engagement: leveraging Indo-Pacific communities in Canada as economic and diplomatic connectors
- Development cooperation: governance, climate resilience, inclusive growth

# Annex - Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy implementation

## I. What's Working

- Presence & signalling: Stronger diplomatic, military, and ministerial engagement with Japan, Korea, ASEAN, and India.
- Security & defence: Regular naval deployments; expanded maritime domain awareness; deeper defence diplomacy.
- Critical minerals partnerships: MOUs and supply-chain agreements with Japan, Korea, and the U.S.
- People-to-people mobility: Growth in education, research, and talent pathways, especially with India and ASEAN.

## II. Where Progress Is Slower

- Investment attraction: Interest from Japan and Korea is high, but large-scale capital inflows remain limited.
- Infrastructure delivery: Ports, rail, transmission, and mineral-processing capacity have remained bottlenecks.
- Trade diversification outcomes: Market access has expanded, but export patterns remain U.S.-centric.
- Whole-of-government coordination: Defence and diplomacy have moved fastest; economic and infrastructure pillars lag

## III. Assessment

- Canada has built the architecture of an Indo-Pacific strategy — presence, partnerships, credibility — but the economic engine (investment + infrastructure) is still catching up.
- The next phase requires execution, not just new announcements.